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Abstract—In this work, we generalize the study of quantifying
the differential privacy guarantees of gossip protocols. Firstly,
The lower bound of differential privacy of all gossip protocols
is estimated for general networks in both synchronous and
asynchronous settings. Secondly, in wireless networks, consid-
ering unreliable links for both node’s communications and
attacker’s detection, a fail probability is adopted. The trade-off
between spreading time and differential privacy of standard and
private gossips is investigated and it is suggested that noise can
serve as a useful privacy protection tool. Finally, the delayed
monitoring, a more realistic monitoring model, is considered,
and the corresponding differential privacy is evaluated.
Index Terms—gossip protocol, differential privacy, informa-
tion spreading
I. INTRODUCTION
Privacy is important for everyone. Recent exposure of the
Facebook user data leakage accelerates people’s privacy
awareness and galvanizes the attention of researchers. On the
one hand, companies need data to build models for their
services which requires features learned through the data.
On the other hand, analyzing the data potentially reveals
certain private information from the data, which can be further
inferred by adversary through attacks like the linkage attack.
To tackle the dilemma between privacy and data usage, differ-
ential privacy is proposed [1]. Differential privacy is a widely
adopted framework for quantifying the privacy guarantees
of privacy-preserving data analysis algorithms. Differential
privacy has been extensively used in machine learning and
data analysis for designing privacy-preserving algorithms.
However, besides the conventional static data privacy, privacy
concern also arises in many other scenarios. For example, peo-
ple wish to remain anonymous in the online world especially
when they try to publish some sensitive information. Private
information is often shared by different organizations during
collaboration and needs to remain anonymous to others. This
kind of privacy concerning identity during the information
distribution process is considered as the information source
privacy and has been recognized and investigated recently.
The information source privacy is studied in [2] using the
differential privacy framework for the complete network. The
information distribution model used in this work is gossip
protocols. Gossip protocols, with their simple and efficient
features, are commonly adopted in distributed applications
for information exchange. In machine learning, gossip pro-
tocols are often combined with stochastic gradient descent
to implement the distributed machine/deep learning [3]–[5].
Gossip protocols are highly robust and adaptive, therefore they
are often adopted in dynamic networks like mobile networks,
wireless sensor networks, and unstructured p2p networks [6]–
[8]. They are also used to model the information spreading
in social networks with direct communications [9]. The speed
of the gossip-based information spreading process is studied
for general networks and multiplex networks in [9], [10].
Therefore, it is crucial to understand the limit of the privacy
guarantee of gossip protocols.
The differential privacy of gossip protocols in the complete
network is investigated in [2]. However, the complete network
assumption is unrealistic. In this work, we generalize the
study of quantifying the source privacy of push-based gossip
protocols using differential privacy to general networks. There
are three major contributions of this work:
1) A lower bound of the differential privacy guarantees of
general gossip protocols is estimated for general net-
works in both synchronous and asynchronous settings.
The prediction uncertainty of the source node given a
uniform prior is also calculated.
2) The differential privacy of standard gossip and private
gossip protocols is studied in wireless networks, where
communications are assumed to be unreliable. It is
found that noise can enhance the differential privacy
while it also slows down the spreading process. Through
calculating and simulating the spreading times in net-
works with unreliable communications, the tradeoff
between the differential privacy and spreading speed is
observed.
3) Finally, the delayed monitoring, a more realistic moni-
toring model, is studied for general networks. The effect
of the additional uncertainty brought by the delay on the
differential privacy is shown.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section
II illustrates the formulation of differential privacy of gossip
protocols. Section III presents the system model. All theoret-
ical results and simulation results are presented in section IV.
Finally, section V concludes this paper.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
In this work, we consider the privacy of information source
in gossip-based single-piece information spreading. The goal
is to measure the capability of gossip protocols in keeping
the information source anonymous. Specifically, given a con-
nected networkG = (V,E), where V = {0, 1, ..., n−1} is the
node set and E is the edge set connecting these nodes, a node
(source) initially possesses a piece of information and needs to
deliver it to all other nodes in the network. Meanwhile, there
are some attackers that can observe some activities and try to
identify the source based on their observations. Differential
privacy is a common framework for the study of privacy
measure and protection and defined as follows:
A randomized algorithm R with domain N|χ| is (ǫ, δ)-
differentially private if for all S ⊆ range(R) and for any
two databases x, y such that ‖x− y‖1 ≤ 1 (i.e., at most one
row of difference in data):
Pr[R(x) ∈ S] ≤ eǫPr[R(y) ∈ S] + δ. (1)
Consider a source indicator vector D = [⌈0, ⌈1, ..., ⌈n−1]
with exactly one none zero value ⌈i = 1 if node i is the
source. Given D , {D(i)}n−1i=0 (a set of source indicator
vector databases in which each database is a single column
indicator vector with rows being the node’s ID) and the
graph G as inputs, gossip protocols can be viewed as the
randomized algorithm and the output S consists of all possible
observations by the attacker. To measure the capability of
gossip protocols in protecting the source’s identity, differential
privacy of the source indicator database can be similarly
defined as [2]:
Definition 1: Given a graph G, a gossip protocol is (ǫ, δ)-
differentially private in G if for any possible observation S ⊂
S and any two source indicator vectors D(i) = [0, ..., ⌈i =
1, ..., 0],D(j) = [0, ..., ⌈j = 1, ..., 0], i, j ∈ {0, 1, ..., n− 1}:
p
(i)
G (S) ≤ e
ǫp
(j)
G (S) + δ, (2)
where p
(i)
G (S) = Pr[S|G,D
(i)] is the conditional probability
of an observation S given the graphG and the source indicator
vector D(i).
In differential privacy, ǫ is considered as the privacy loss
while δ is the tolerance level. Specifically, given the privacy
loss ǫ and tolerance level δ, Eq. (2) implies that the random-
ized algorithm guarantees the privacy loss is bounded by ǫ
with probability at least 1−δ. In this work, considering the fact
that, due to the topological and observation model constraints,
there exists events S such that p
(j)
G (S) = 0, for some S (e.g.,
if Si,0 is the observed event that node i informs a node at time
0, then p
(j)
G (Si,0) = 0, ∀j 6= i), it is meaningless to study the
privacy loss in this situation as the privacy loss log(
p
(i)
G
(Si,0)
p
(j)
G
(Si,0)
)
is infinite. Thus, certain tolerance δ is needed and how well
the gossip protocols can guarantee a given privacy loss ǫ is
the main focus of this study.
III. SYSTEM MODEL
A. Gossip Protocol
As a common tool used for distributed applications, classic
gossip protocols share the same key communication compo-
nent gossip that can be performed by any node i ∈ I (I is the
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Fig. 1. Sensor Monitoring and Observations
informed node set). Each time a node i performs the gossip
action, it will contact one of its neighboring nodes j ∈ Ni
with a uniform probability of 1/di (di is the degree of i). After
the gossip action finishes, the informed node set is updated
if the initial node has the information and the contacted node
has no information. Such protocols are also named as push
protocols in literature.1 In short, gossip protocols are defined
as a class of protocols that (1) update the informed node
set I through the gossip actions and (2) terminate when all
nodes {0, 1, ..., n−1} receive the information. Two following
specific gossip protocols are considered in this work.
1) Standard Gossip: All informed nodes remain active
during the spreading process.
2) Private Gossip [2]: Once an active informed node in-
formed a new uninforms node, it turns inactive.
B. Time Model
Both synchronous and asynchronous time models are consid-
ered for the gossip-based information spreading process. In
the synchronous time model, all nodes share a global discrete
time clock. Each time the clock ticks, all nodes perform
the gossip action and the informed node set is updated
accordingly. In the asynchronous time model, each node has
its own internal clock which ticks according to a rate 1 Poisson
process. The gossip action and update of informed node set is
performed each time the clock of an informed node is ticked.
C. Observation Model
It is assumed that there are a group of sensors deployed
by the attacker in the network that can scan and eavesdrop
the communications among the nodes. However, due to the
limited eavesdropping capability, it is assumed that with a
1In pull protocols, uninformed nodes are active and try to pull the
information from informed nodes.
probability of α, the sensors can correctly detect and observe
the ongoing communication. Specifically, the observed event
has the form of S = ((i, t)), i ∈ {0, 1, ..., n−1}, t ∈ N0 in the
synchronous setting indicating that the attacker knows exactly
when each node performs its gossip action (the attacker,
therefore, can infer node’s active state at each time). In the
asynchronous setting, however, the attacker does not know the
exact time of each observed event, but it knows the relative
order of nodes’ activities. The observed event in this case is
represented by S = ((i)|(i, t)), where the conditional (i, t)
stands for the latent information not known to the attacker.
The details are shown in Fig. 1.
D. Prediction Uncertainty
The definition of differential privacy does not provide guar-
antees for the source indistinguishability. In order to avoid
the “bad” things (i.e., the source is identified by the attacker)
from happening, it is further required that some prediction
uncertainty is guaranteed for a given differentially private
protocol, defined as:
Definition 2: Given a graph G, a gossip protocol can
guarantee c-prediction uncertainty if there is a constant c > 0
such that for a uniform prior pG(I0) on source nodes and any
i ∈ {0, 1, ..., n− 1}:
pG(I0 6= {i}|S)
pG(I0 = {i}|S)
≥ c, ∀S ⊂ S, p
(i)
G (S) > 0, (3)
where I0 stands for the informed node set at time 0 and the
element of it represents the source node.
Remark 1: Differential privacy and prediction uncertainty
are related but not the same. Especially, because of the
uniform prior pG(I0),
pG(I0 6={i}|S)
pG(I0={i}|S)
=
∑
j 6=i p
(j)
G
(S)
p
(i)
G
(S)
by the
Bayes’ formula. Moreover, given a prediction uncertainty of
c, it can be shown that pG(I0 = {i}|S) ≤
1
c+1 , ∀i,S.
IV. MAIN RESULTS
To facilitate our following analysis, we need the following
Lemma and definition of decay centrality.
Lemma 1: Given any gossip protocol in a graph G, let
S ⊂ S and there are two constants w
(i)
G (S), w
(j)
G (S) such
that p
(i)
G (S) ≥ w
(i)
G (S) and p
(j)
G (S) ≤ w
(j)
G (S). If the
gossip protocol satisfies (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy, then δ ≥
maxS,i,j(w
(i)
G (S)− e
ǫw
(j)
G (S)).
Proof: By the definition of differential privacy, δ ≥
p
(i)
G (S)−e
ǫp
(j)
G (S), ∀S, i, j, therefore, δ ≥ maxS,i,j(p
(i)
G (S)−
eǫp
(j)
G (S)) ≥ maxS,i,j(w
(i)
G (S) − e
ǫw
(j)
G (S)).
Definition 3: Given a network G , (E, V ), consider a
decay parameter β, 0 < β < 1, the decay centrality of node
i is defined as
Cβ(i) =
∑
j 6=i
βd(i,j), (4)
where d(i, j) is the shortest path between node i and j.
Remark 2: Decay centrality measures the ease of any node
reaching other nodes. If the decay centrality of a node is large,
it means that it is close to the other nodes in the network and
easy to reach them. The difficulty increases as δ decreases.
A. Differential Privacy of Gossip Protocols in General Net-
works
Given a network G with n nodes and diameter of DG =
maxi∈V ( min
j∈V,j 6=i
d(i, j)) (d(i, j) is the distance between node
i and j), if the attacker is able to detect any communication
happening within the network with a probability of α, the
differential privacy of gossip protocols in this network is given
by:
Theorem 1: If a gossip protocol satisfies (ǫ, δ)-differential
privacy and c-prediction uncertainty, then we have δ ≥ α and
c = 0 in the synchronous setting. In the asynchronous setting,
δ ≥ max[α− eǫ(1 − α)DG , α− eǫ
1− α
n− 1
] (5)
and
c ≤ min
i∈V
C1−α(i)
α
. (6)
Proof: First, for the synchronous setting, let Si,0 be
the event that node i’s activity is observed by the attacker’s
sensors at time 0. Then, the probability that such event
happens given the source node is i is p
(i)
G (Si,0) = α. If source
node is any other node j 6= i, p
(j)
G (Si,0) = 0 since node i
cannot initialize a communication if it is not a source node
at time 0. Therefore, δ ≥ α and c = 0.
In the asynchronous setting, on the one hand, let Si,0 be
the event that node i’s activity is observed by the attacker’s
sensors and it is the first event record. It can be seen that, if the
source node is i, then p
(i)
G (Si,0) = p
(i)
G (Si,0|Ti,0)p
(i)
G (Ti,0) +
p
(i)
G (Si,0|T i,0)p
(i)
G (T i,0) ≥ α, where Ti,0 stands for the event
that the source node is detected during its first communication.
If the source node is j, then the following event needs to be
considered to find out p
(j)
G (Si,0): there is no communication
detected by the sensors in the network after d(i, j) communi-
cations have been executed. This event is denoted as Od(i,j).
The probability of this event is p
(j)
G (Od(i,j)) = (1 − α)
d(i,j).
Notice that it requires at least d(i, j) for the information to
reach node i from node j in any push-based gossip protocols.
Therefore, p
(j)
G (Od(i,j)
⋂
Si,0) = 0 (Od(i,j) stands for the
complementary events of Od(i,j) and it means that there is
at least one communication observed by the sensors in d(i, j)
rounds), this is by the fact that node i’s activity cannot be
observed by attackers before d(i, j) as the information has
not reached to node i. In all, we have
p
(j)
G (Si,0) = p
(j)
G (Si,0
⋂
Od(i,j)) + p
(j)
G (Si,0
⋂
Od(i,j))
= p
(j)
G (Si,0
⋂
Od(i,j))
≤ p
(j)
G (Od(i,j)) = (1− α)
d(i,j).
(7)
Also, p
(i)
G (Si,0) ≥ α as the source node has α probability to
be detected during its first communication which makes it the
first node in attacker’s record. Finally, by applying Lemma 1,
we have
δ ≥ max
S,i,j
(w
(i)
G (S)− e
ǫw
(j)
G (S))
≥ max
i,j
(p
(i)
G (Si,0)− e
ǫp
(j)
G (Si,0))
≥ max
i,j
(α− eǫ(1− α)d(i,j))
≥ α− eǫ(1− α)DG .
(8)
On the other hand, since
∑
j∈V p
(i)
G (Sj,0) = 1, therefore,
there exists a node l ∈ V such that,
(n− 1)p
(i)
G (Sl,0) ≤
∑
j∈V,j 6=i
p
(i)
G (Sj,0)
= 1− p
(i)
G (Si,0) ≤ 1− α,
→ p
(i)
G (Sl,0) ≤
1− α
n− 1
, for some l ∈ V.
(9)
This implies, δ ≥ α− eǫ 1−α
n−1 . By Eq. (8), we have
δ ≥ max[α − eǫ(1− α)DG , α− eǫ
1− α
n− 1
] (10)
Meanwhile, as we have p
(j)
G (Si,0) ≤ (1 − α)
d(i,j), then the
detection uncertainty can be calculated as
c ≤ min
i,S
(
∑
j 6=i p
(j)
G (S)
p
(i)
G (S)
)
≤ min
i
∑
j 6=i(1− α)
d(i,j)
α
= min
i∈V
C1−α(i)
α
.
(11)
Remark 3: In the context of information spreading, if two
nodes are distant, it takes time for information to be spread
from one to the other and this time allows the attacker
to detect possible distinguishable events which causes the
privacy loss of the node’s identity. The network diameter
DG, as the overall distance measure of the whole network,
captures the potential privacy loss between any two nodes
and becomes one deciding factor of the differential privacy
lower bound in Eq. (5). The same logic is reflected on the
prediction uncertainty, if every node is close to any other
nodes in the network, all nodes are “similar” to each other in
terms of information spreading. Therefore, the larger decay
centrality a network has, the more unlikely that the attacker
can identify the source node through its observations. Such
network constraint in preserving privacy is unavoidable by any
spreading protocols and needs to be dealt with other protection
mechanisms.
B. Differential Privacy of Gossip Protocols in Wireless Net-
works
Distributed machine learning is considered as one of the
major techniques to help manage the increasing data vol-
umes and algorithm-driven applications in modern wireless
systems. As an important component in distributed machine
learning [5], the differential privacy of gossip protocols in
wireless networks is investigated in this part. It is assumed
that the communications between nodes and the monitoring
from the attacker are not perfect in wireless systems due to
different kind of interferences (e.g., noises). To simplify the
analysis, a fail probability is considered in this setting: Due to
interferences, the communications can fail with a probability
of f between two nodes during the gossip step and it is
assumed that the attacker fails to receive a report from its
sensors during its monitoring with the same probability f .2
Note that the fail probability f is caused by the natural con-
ditions like the wireless channel quality, while the unperfect
detection probability α is due to the eavesdropping capability
(e.g., computation power) of the attacker. In this case, the
differential privacy of gossip protocols are shown through the
following theorem.
Theorem 2: In a wireless environment with legitimate
communications and adversarial monitoring failed with a
probability of f and a given wireless network G, the gossip-
based protocols can guarantee the (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy
with δ ≥ α(1− f) and c-prediction uncertainty with c = 0 in
the synchronous setting, and δ ≥ max[α(1−f)−eǫ(1−α(1−
f))DG , α(1 − f)− eǫ 1−α(1−f)
n−1 ] and c ≤ mini∈V
C1−α(1−f)(i)
α(1−f) in
the asynchronous setting.
Proof: This is a straightforward extension from the
previous results with an additional factor of 1− f .
It is obvious that differential privacy will increase in a bad
wireless environment as the attacker is hard to monitor the
node’s activities. However, the information spreading process
is impeded as well when the fail probability f is high. The
information spreading time of the standard gossip protocol and
private gossip protocol in this case can be estimated through
the following theorem.
Theorem 3: In a wireless environment with communications
being failed with a probability of f and a given wireless
network G, we have
1) In the synchronous and asynchronous settings, the
private gossip takes average CG/(1 − f) rounds and
CG/(1 − f) time to inform all nodes in the network,
respectively, where CG is the cover time of a random
walk in network G.
2) In the asynchronous setting, if the standard gossip
spreads information to all nodes in Tas/(1 − f) time
on average, where Tas is the spreading time of standard
gossip when the communication is perfect.
Sketch of Proof: For private gossip, it is a single random
walk on the graph. The average time to inform all nodes is
equal to CG in both synchronous and asynchronous settings.
Also, given a fail probability of f , the interstate time is am-
plified by a factor of 1/(1−f). Therefore, the average time to
inform all nodes is equal to CG/(1−f) for both synchronous
and asynchronous settings. Same logic can applied to standard
gossip in the asynchronous setting, as in each round, there is
only one node being activated and the communication fail
2As the first work in exploring this area, this simple assumption is adopted.
More realistic assumption will be explored in our future work.
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Fig. 2. Tradeoff between DP and spreading speed in the synchronous setting
is independent of the next node being activated. Thus, the
interstate time is amplified by a factor of 1/(1 − f) as well
which gives the result in 2).
Remark 4: For standard gossip in the synchronous setting,
multiple random walks can exists during the spreading process
which renders the analysis of unreliable spreading challenging
in general networks. But we argue that our results above shall
remain valid in this case through following conjecture:
Conjecture 1: In the synchronous setting, the standard
gossip spreads information to all nodes in Tas/(1−f) time on
average, where Tas is the spreading time of standard gossip
when the communication is perfect.
The above results show that the interference like noise,
though improves the overall differential privacy of gossip
protocols in wireless systems, also slows down the informa-
tion spreading process. The trade-off between privacy and
spreading speed is shown in the following simulation results.
Erdo˝s Re´nyi (ER) networks and Geometric Random (GR)
Networks with a total number of n = 10000 nodes and
average degree of 10 are considered. Each point in the figure is
obtained based on simulations with 5 graph instances and 100
Monte Carlo runs for each instance. Here, the average 90%
spreading time is considered, i.e., the average time required
for 90% of nodes in the network to be informed. The privacy-
speed tradeoffs for ER and GR networks for standard gossip
in the synchronous and asynchronous settings are plotted in
Figs. 2 and 3, respectively. It is assumed that α = 0.5 and
privacy loss ǫ = 1. The corresponding privacy lower bound
δ can be calculated for ER and GR networks using Theorem
2 given the fail probability f . Similar results can be obtained
for the private gossip and are omitted here due to the space
constraint.
Remark 5: In wireless networks, the interference like Noise
is indeed a useful tool to help strengthen the differential
privacy of gossip protocols as it lowers the probability of
activity detection by the attacker. However, such benefit is
based on the sacrifice of spreading speed. In calculations and
simulations, it can be seen that the spreading speed is inversely
proportional to 1−f while the privacy lower bound is propor-
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Fig. 3. Tradeoff between DP and spreading speed in the asynchronous setting
tional to 1−f . The differential privacy of gossip protocols can
be strengthened with a small loss of spreading speed which
suggests that methods like artificial noise protection can be
useful in privacy-preserving information spreading.
C. Differential Privacy of Gossip Protocols in Delayed Mon-
itoring
In reality, the attacker often cannot monitor the whole in-
formation spreading process starting from the beginning. In
this section, we try to estimate the differential privacy of
general gossip protocols when the monitoring is delayed. To
simply the analysis, it is assumed that the attacker knows
the number of rounds that have passed in the synchronous
setting or the number of communications that have occurred
in the asynchronous setting since the beginning of information
spreading.
Theorem 4: Given a network G with diameter DG, if the
attacker starts monitoring the information spreading process
t rounds (or t times of communications in the asynchronous
case) after it begins and t < DG, the gossip-based protocols
can guarantee the (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy with δ ≥ 1
dtmax
α
in the synchronous setting and in the asynchronous setting
δ ≥max[
1
dtmax(t+ 1)!
α− eǫ(1 − α)DG−t,
1
dtmax(t+ 1)!
α− eǫ
1− 1
dtmax(t+1)!
α
n− 1
, 0].
(12)
Proof: In the synchronous setting, consider two nodes i, j
such that d(i, j) = DG, given the event that node i’s activity
is observed by the attacker the moment it starts monitoring
which is denoted as Si,0, it is clear that p
(j)
G (Si,0) = 0 since
it takes at least DG > t steps for the information to flow
to node i from node j. Consider another node k such that
d(k, i) = t, the probability that node i is informed at round t
is
p
(k)
G (i ∈ It) ≥
∏
m∈pk→i
pk→i:L(pk→i)=t
1
dm
≥ (
1
dmax
)t, (13)
where pk→i is a path from node k to node i and L(pk→i) is
the length of this path. Then p
(k)
G (Si,0) ≥ (
1
dmax
)tα.3 Finally,
by Lemma 1, δ ≥ ( 1
dmax
)tα.
In the asynchronous setting, Si,0 denotes the event that
node i’s activity is the first one observed by the attacker.
Again, consider two nodes i, j such d(i, j) = DG. After t
communications, if the source node is j, information reaches
to a newly informed node k, it is the closest node to node i,
and d(k, i) ≥ (DG − t). As it requires at least d(k, i) rounds
for information to reach node i, consider Od(i,j) as the event
that no communications is observed by the attacker in d(i, j)
communications. Then,
p
(j)
G (Si,0) = p
(j)
G (Si,0
⋂
Od(k,j)) + p
(j)
G (Si,0
⋂
Od(k,j))
= p
(j)
G (Si,0
⋂
Od(k,j))
≤ p
(j)
G (Od(k,j)) = (1− α)
d(k,i) ≤ (1− α)DG−t.
(14)
Also, consider another node l such that d(l, i) = t, the
probability that node i is informed at tth communication is
p
(l)
G (i ∈ It) ≥ (
∏
m∈pl→i
pl→i:L(pl→i)=t
1
dm
)
1
t!
≥
1
dtmaxt!
, (15)
where 1
t! is the probability that all node in a path pl→i are
activated in a fixed order so that information reaches node i
after t communications from node l. Finally, the probability
that node i is activated and its gossip action is observed by
the attacker is 1
t+1α. Therefore, p
(l)
G (Si,0) ≥
1
dtmax(t+1)!
α.
Finally, by Lemma 1, the same logic as Eq. (9), and δ ≥ 0, we
have δ ≥ max[ 1
dtmax(t+1)!
α − eǫ(1 − α)DG−t, 1
dtmax(t+1)!
α −
eǫ
1− 1
dtmax(t+1)!
α
n−1 , 0].
Remark 6: Gossip protocols are not able to protect the
source’s identity effectively during the early stage of informa-
tion spreading as gossip protocols have only been performed
for a few rounds introducing barely any randomization into
the output observations. More randomization indeed indicates
stronger privacy which requires more rounds of gossiping.
Therefore, in delayed monitoring, it is more and more difficult
for the attacker to identify the rumor source as the delayed
time increases.
V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORKS
In this paper, we investigate the differential privacy of gossip
protocols in general networks. A lower bound of differential
privacy of all gossip protocols is given for general graphs.
In the asynchronous setting, it is related to the network
diameter as the difference between two nodes in the context
of information spreading is determined by their distance.
The prediction uncertainty of gossip protocols in this case
is related to the decay centrality of the network. In wireless
networks, due to possible unreliable communications, a fail
probability is assumed for both the communications between
3A newly informed node has to be active in its first communication with
other nodes in any gossip protocols, otherwise, there is a nonzero probability
that the information cannot be spread to the whole network.
nodes and the detection by the attacker. Though there exists a
tradeoff between privacy and the information spreading speed,
the calculations and simulations based on private and standard
gossips in random networks like ER and GR networks sug-
gest noise is effective in protecting the differential privacy
of gossip protocols considering the spreading speed as the
cost. Finally, in delayed monitoring, it is revealed that the
differential privacy of gossip protocols is enhanced as the
delayed rounds increases.
Many interesting problems remain open in this direction.
For example, if the attacker is able to measure the distance
between any two nodes in the network and rule out those
impossible source nodes given every possible observations,
what will the corresponding differential privacy be like?
In addition, if the observation model is switched back to
the network snapshot, how can we measure the differential
privacy of gossip protocols in this case? These problems will
be further explored in our future work.
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